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I. Back-Drop
Kenya’s arid and semi-arid regions are characterized by sparse vege-
tation and low rainfall, receiving annual average amounts of between 
500mm and 800mm. Covering 82% of Kenya’s entire territory, it also 
contains 50% of Kenya’s total livestock herd. The land is communally 
owned by the pastoralists groups inhabiting these areas, the major 
ones being the Somali, Samburu, Rendille, Boran and Turkana. Live-
stock is individually owned and economic life revolves around the 
household unit which usually consists of an extended family orga-
nized on kinship basis. The main drainage features are the Tana, Uaso 
Nyiro, Turkwell and Dawa rivers. The economy is characterized by 
the pastoral mode of production where different types of livestock 
such as camel, cattle, sheep and goats are raised for subsistence and 
increasingly, commercial purposes. The stock is moved within a nat-
ural ecological region that has fairly well-set boundaries. Traditional 
patterns of land use are adhered to following cyclical variations in 
rainfall (Campbell & Migot-Adholla, 1981:1).
The history of marginalization in Northern Kenya can be traced 
back to the colonial era when Britain established a colonial protectorate 
in the East African country at the turn of the nineteenth century. Nom-
inally, their rule covered a vast stretch of land in northern Kenya that 
they called the Northern Frontier District (NFD). Due to its remote-
ness, aridity and resistance by the Somali inhabitants, the British colo-
nial government largely ignored the area in terms of development. 
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They occupied themselves with policing the region and establishing 
rudimentary administrative structures. For the duration of their rule, 
the area remained underdeveloped (Turton, 1972:119–143).
The problem was compounded by the insistence of the Somalis 
to be a distinct nation and their right to self-determination, a policy 
they pursued peacefully in pre-independent Kenya and forcibly after 
independence in 1963. The first decade of Kenya’s independence was 
marked by government efforts to suppress the guerilla warfare that 
was being carried out by Somali secessionists in the NFD. By 1970, the 
secessionist movement was defeated militarily and, except for isolated 
and ill-equipped bands roaming the countryside, the guerilla war had 
come to an end. Despite this, the NFD remained relatively underdevel-
oped with the independent state of Kenya pursuing policies that were 
reminiscent of colonial times. The region remained closed from the 
rest of the country and, arbitrary and discriminatory laws were often 
applied (Markakis, 1987:185).
II. The Role of the State
Why does the state intervene? In most cases in the developing world 
the rationale for state intervention stems from the need to “modernize” 
indigenous modes of production with a view to increasing efficiency 
and productivity. Furthermore, and ideologically, whether in statist 
or capitalist inspired countries, the idea is to transform the peasant 
from a subsistence based pre-capitalist mode of production to one that 
will ensure a surplus. The underlying philosophy is that what is “tra-
ditional” is antiquated, inefficient and incompatible with modern life. 
Therefore, since the people are not willing to change, thus presenting 
obstacles to development, the state has to be the major actor in bring-
ing about change (Gefu, 1992:35).
The state has invariably blamed the underdevelopment of northern 
Kenya on the scarcity of resources, aridity, remoteness, local resis-
tance and insecurity. The identification of these problems has been 
accepted by the state as the most rational and realistic explanation for 
the marginalization of northern Kenya. There is no denying that these 
are important factors in explaining and propagating state policies vis-
à-vis the underdevelopment of this region or its disparities with other 
regions in Kenya.
However, it is sometimes ignored that the state, having monop-
oly over a country’s resources and their redistribution can, and often 
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does, use this power to restrict or stem undesirable tendencies mani-
fested by a segment of the population. This forms the political aspect 
in the study of regional development or disparities in a heterogeneous 
state like Kenya. It is arguable that the past history of the NFD, the 
desire for self-determination and secession, has shaped to a signifi-
cant degree subsequent state policy with regard to development or 
non-development of this area. As a response to earlier threats on state 
sovereignty and territory, it is conceivable that the Kenyan state has set 
up policies and institutions that inhibit development of this area. State 
ambivalence may not be spelled in black and white, but it is tacit and 
manifests itself in the administration of the region, now known as the 
North-Eastern Province of Kenya, and the policies pursued by the state 
with respect to development issues in the area (Markakis, 2011:153).
The overwhelming presence of the state in pre and post-colonial 
Africa rendered the rural and urban masses virtually powerless and 
at the mercy of state policies that hardly incorporated their views. A 
core of elitist state planners set the agenda for development to tailor 
their peripheral economies to the core capitalist economies. Thus, the 
rural folk became marginalized and alienated from their governments. 
But rather than become pliant victims of a much more organized insti-
tution such as the state, the rural communities exhibited their feelings 
through the subtle presence of social struggle (Taylor & Mackenzie, 
1992:1).
In areas where the state was able to supress organised communal 
resistance, there emerged passive forms of that gave voice to the mar-
ginalized rural poor. Thus, what the state came to term as obstacles 
to development viz apathy and the presence of obdurate and anti-
quated customs “could easily be translated by the rural folk as defense 
mechanisms against the overwhelming presence of the state.” Popular 
resistance to the violence meted out by the postcolonial Kenyan state 
against the pastoralists manifested itself as banditry, cattle rustling 
and disorder. This form of rural violence was often a response to state 
or ruling class violence (Crummey, 1986:1). These manifestations of 
violence against the central state have persisted for much of the post-
colonial history of Northern Kenya.
State policies that encourage the settlement of pastoralists without 
offering them a viable alternative contribute to the increasing impov-
erishment of these inhabitants of the dry lands. Land use practices 
engaged in or encouraged by the state, such as irrigation, have only 
served to alienate pastoralists from their prime grazing lands. Most of 
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the irrigation schemes that have been set up in the dry lands of Kenya 
do not benefit the indigenous inhabitants as migrant farmers are set-
tled in these schemes. Large tracts of land have also been set-aside as 
game parks and national reserves with the attendant restrictions on 
pastoralist use of these lands.
Encouraging crop production in marginal areas has only served to 
aggravate land degradation in already fragile environments. At the 
same time, there has been a significant neglect of the livestock sector 
in dry lands, especially camel pastoralism, as the state pursues agri-
cultural policies designed to increase crop production in an effort to 
promote local self-sufficiency. The problem with dry lands in Kenya, 
therefore is one that can easily be traced to state planners and bureau-
crats who design policies from their insulated positions at the cen-
ter while disregarding traditional practices of dry land management 
(Hogg, 1987: 47).
III. Environmental Desiccation
The economic problems of sub-Saharan African countries have been 
compounded by the rapid degradation of their environment. Prob-
lems like soil erosion, deforestation and desertification have had a 
great impact on land use and agricultural production, often leading 
to adverse and seemingly irreversible conditions. Environmental deg-
radation has had its greatest impact on the inhabitants of these threat-
ened lands i.e., the rural poor. Their conditions of life have plunged 
below the poverty line and their survival is often precarious (Hope, 
2008:2).
The stress on land resources has been blamed on a variety of factors 
like excessive grazing, competition for increasingly scarce land, cutting 
of trees for fuel wood and general misuse of land resources. These 
factors all stem from the human pressure on renewable resources in 
the environment (Southgate and Disinger, 1985:1). Planners have been 
quick to apportion blame for the ecological disasters to the perceived 
agricultural malpractices of the rural poor.
Undoubtedly, the rural poor have played some role in the environ-
mental mess we find ourselves in today. However, in many instances, 
the state and its planners have been the major cause of environmental 
disaster in arid lands, and the rural peasantry has merely acted in 
response to state policies that are in themselves adverse to traditional 
agricultural practices and sustainability of the environment. These pol-
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icies have evoked responses from the rural poor that have been inter-
preted as being threatening to the ecology. This situation not only 
applies in Northern Kenya, but also in the Sahelian states of Africa, 
where the human and physical condition of the dry lands is very sim-
ilar.
One of the major areas of concern has been the rapid rate of desert-
ification in many African countries. The rate of forest and woodland 
clearing has been alarming. It has been estimated that the forest areas 
in developing countries are being cleared at the rate of 17 million 
hectares a year (Sitarz, 1994). The loss in vegetation cover’ results in 
accelerated soil erosion and its attendant problems. There is no doubt 
that desertification is taking place at an accelerated rate. The impact of 
this rapidly degrading rural environment in many sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries has been compounded by periodic bouts of drought. 
The drought cycles of the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s are significant in this 
respect. They have led to a greater stress on the land and have acceler-
ated the disruptive effects of human activity in fragile ecosystems. The 
resultant degradation has led to soil erosion, absence of firewood for 
energy and the persistent problem of creeping deserts.
IV. Development Paradigms and the Roots of Marginalization
The approach of development from below is usually criticized as 
neo-populist and utopian (Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992:28). Local com-
munities are seen to be diverse in composition and interests. Empow-
ering the people means a transfer of power from the state. The presence 
of predatory states in Africa clearly showed the contradictions of main-
taining state power and empowering the people at the same time. The 
response of the state in Kenya, and indeed in much of Africa, has been 
to place the blame on the pastoralists’ patterns of land use in marginal 
areas. Overgrazing and overstocking of herds on marginal areas have 
been cited as major culprits. (Hogg, 1987: 47) The answer to land deg-
radation in dry lands then obviously becomes the management and 
improvement of these pastoralist practices, with a view to eliminating 
or substituting harmful use of the land.
The state in Kenya therefore has instituted measures which include 
rural afforestation schemes, soil conservation measures, animal graz-
ing restrictions and the settling of pastoralists. Some of the activities 
are laudable in their intent, but they do not often achieve results. 
Range development practices assume that technology and new range 
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practices will improve traditional pastoralism. As Morris notes in his 
study of the Maasai Range Development Project initiated by USAID, 
this premise is fundamentally wrong (Moris, 1981:99–113). His study 
shows that the range management project among the Maasai failed 
after ten years in operation and had to be abandoned. It illustrated the 
chasm between official project and state policy and the actual situation 
on the ground. It highlights the loss of prime grazing lands by pastoral-
ists to farmers. The study concludes that the pastoral problem is essen-
tially a systems problem (Morris, ibid.:12). The state also assumes that 
the pastoralists cannot take care of their own rangelands, a common 
notion stemming from the “tragedy of the commons” concept (Hardin, 
1968:1244). However, pastoralists do behave in an ecologically sound 
manner and adhere to age old principles of land management and use. 
State interference increasingly limits their ability to continue practicing 
ecologically sound land management policies (Hogg, ibid.:47–58). The 
government emphasizes destocking as a means of curbing overgrazing 
and soil erosion. This is a resort to treating symptoms instead of pre-
venting the causes.
While to the centrist state it is the most inimical feature of pastoral-
ism, the most significant strategy, from the viewpoint of pastoral life, 
is mobility (Toure, 1988:34). The pastoralist moves his herd of livestock 
from one designated area to another according to the dictates of the 
weather. In his movement, the pastoralist seeks to maximize the utility 
of his scarce resources i.e., water and pasture. In order to do this, he 
must be equipped with a keen knowledge of his environment. Thus, it 
is a mistake to say that pastoralist move from one area to another hap-
hazardly. It implies that the pastoralist is not fully aware of his envi-
ronment. As is evident in many studies, the movement of pastoralist 
is closely regulated and their range of territory remains defined, albeit 
that a certain measure of fluidity is allowed to take into account the 
unpredictability of the weather. At any local level, rangelands are iden-
tified and categorized as dry or wet weather pastures and movement is 
organized according to seasons. Pastoralists have evolved patterns of 
migrations to coincide with dry and wet season patterns. These move-
ments take place within well-defined ecological boundaries that con-
tain a diversity of vegetation and topography (Pratt & Gwynne, 1977). 
The greatest asset a pastoralist has is his ability to move.
Besides environmental consequences, pastoralists also move as a 
response to social or cultural factors such as the attendance of cere-
monial rituals, adverse political conditions and war. Unfortunately, 
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the last two reasons are becoming more and more the reasons why 
pastoralists move. The implications of conflict for the pastoralist are 
particularly grim, especially when coupled with adverse environmen-
tal conditions like drought. Displacement of pastoralist peoples often 
assumes tragic proportions under such conditions.
The problem with dry land management practices in Kenya is not 
the pastoralists inhabiting them but the state planners in the urban 
cities who dish out ill-advised prescriptions. This is in line with the 
diffusion model that the state adheres to as a matter of ideology and 
practice (Gefu, 1992, ibid.). In order to study the problem of rural 
development in Northern Kenya, it is necessary to examine the import-
ant and often conflicting roles played by the two major actors i.e., 
the state and the people at the grassroots. From one perspective, it is 
necessary to examine the policies of the state, the underlying issues 
and assumptions that dictate or shape these policies. From the other 
perspective, it is necessary to examine the socio-cultural, economic and 
ecological imperatives that provide the basic impetus and motivation 
of the pastoralists and is often a critical determinant in gauging their 
reactions to the state or outside players in their life.
In the background, shadowing these two players is perhaps the 
third major player: the environment. Both the pastoralist’s way of life 
and the government policies are designed to mitigate the effects of an 
otherwise harsh climate. The loss of power and ability to cope with 
the harsh environment has made pastoralists even more susceptible 
to adverse weather and drought. This loss of power can be traced to 
inappropriate outside intervention. The affected pastoralists are mired 
in poverty with its attendant problems of poor health, illiteracy, voice-
lessness, insecurity, humiliation and the lack of basic infrastructure 
(Narayan et al. 2000: 4–5). Attendant to this is the loss of traditional 
resource bases and a decline in traditional survival strategies. Thus 
a study of the ecology of the pastoralists and their reactions to it is 
imperative in order to situate the problem of rural development in 
marginal lands in its proper context (Brokensha, Horowitz and Scud-
der, 1977).
It is also important to highlight who determines the discourse of 
development in these arid lands, especially in, light of some of the 
current debate on rural participation, and who the active or passive 
players are. The emphasis on participation may degenerate into build-
ing institutions that have more form than substance. Closely tied to 
this is the transfer of inappropriate technology to the rural area that 
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often results in further degradation of the environment that leads to 
more serious and longer-term implications. All in all, the picture that 
emerges is one of outside players determining the fate and future of 
areas they poorly understand. The dilemma of intervention is that it 
can be positive and negative, depending on whether the donor dictates 
to the recipients or whether it’s a mutually agreed approach.
V. Deconstructing the Path of Development
In order to have a more sustainable approach to developing marginal 
lands, it is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of previous policies and plans. 
It is also necessary to incorporate alternatives based on the experience 
of the people involved. It is imperative to re-examine these policies, 
their impacts on the pastoralists and suggest alternative approaches to 
rural development in arid lands.
In analyzing policies, it is important to note that policy goals and 
their interpretation are often accompanied by value judgments. Thus, 
the goals outlined on paper may reach the grassroots in distorted fash-
ion. This distorted version is crucial because it is the basis of interven-
tion on the ground, and thus far outweighs the original blueprint. It is 
difficult to pin down such distorted policy versions, but perhaps the 
best indicators are gleaned from the actual running of development 
projects and the reaction from the people directly affected by them.
The roots of marginalization in Northern Kenya run deep if viewed 
from both a historical and ecological perspective. There have been 
fundamental weaknesses in the paradigms that have been the model 
for undertaking development in the pastoral lands of northern Kenya. 
A critical evaluation of these paradigms should be the basis for decon-
structing long-held myths about pastoralists who have not only shoul-
dered the burdens of failed interventions, but also the blame. The lack 
of political will on the part of the state to mitigate its neglect of this 
area is almost concomitant with the willingness to blame the victims. 
State policies per se, as outlined in government documents, do not tell 
the whole story.
Initially, the Kenyan state approached development from a neo-clas-
sical point of view, with emphasis on the center as opposed to the 
peripheries. Government policy makers felt that the growth of the 
center would automatically lead to a spatial diffusion of growth to the 
peripheries (Stohr & Taylor 1981). Government’s refusal to deal with 
internal problems like nationalism among ethnic groups within the ter-
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ritory, have led to a blanket treatment of regional differences, thereby 
exacerbate instead of reducing the problem (Seers, 1983).
Experience has shown that this centrist ideology not a wholly accu-
rate vision. The experience in much of colonial and post-colonial Africa 
has been a strong centralized state. This resulted in a centralizing of 
development planning that would later be criticized as remote and 
inaccessible to the majority of the rural poor. Strong centralized gov-
ernments emerged in post-independence Africa, usually dominated 
by a single party. Due to the strong pull of centralization, the last 
vestiges of rural power that remained in the local or district councils 
were removed and governments stepped in to take over the provision 
of social services and infrastructure. Under this commandist approach, 
Kenya achieved a high rate of economic growth with an annual aver-
age real growth rate of seven percent (Godfrey, 1986). The government 
had placed stress on and encouraged.the growth of the productive 
sectors in the country. Thus, areas growing prime commodity ‘crops 
like coffee and tea witnessed rapid growth while the rest of the coun-
try lagged behind. There emerged widening regional disparities in the 
country despite the fact that there was a high rate of economic growth 
(Nyongo, 1987).
The centralist approach has also been reproached for concentrating 
on economic goals at the expense of other equally important social 
needs. Regional and income inequalities emerged in countries pur-
suing a purely centralized form of development planning. The trick-
le-down effect never materialized and large segments of the rural 
population continued to live in poverty. Even the shift from this par-
adigm in the early 1990s to one that emphasized development from 
below and the current district based devolution shift came too late and 
has had little impact on the life of pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Con-
sequently, there has been no substantial effect on the development of 
the dry lands of Northern Kenya to date.
The path of “development” that the government has followed 
include the settling of pastoralists in towns and villages, ostensibly to 
provide them with the necessary government services such as health 
and education, as well as instilling in them a sense of “nationhood.” 
Sedentary agricultural practices are also encouraged as a way of 
increasing food production, combating desertification, and improv-
ing the standard of living among the inhabitants of these dry lands. 
The ultimate goal is to make them “self-sufficient,” the assumption of 
course being that pastoralism promotes dependency on the state. The 
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irony is that these misguided policies have made the once self-suffi-
cient pastoralists even more dependent on the state, as the widespread 
and continuous use of famine relief aptly illustrates (Hogg, 1983:64–
168).
These policies, however, ignore the basic fact that rotational pasto-
ralism has evolved as the best possible response to the adverse ecolog-
ical conditions that prevail in the dry lands, and that, to a large extent, 
the mobility of pastoralists is motivated by sound ecological consider-
ations that permit the regeneration of denuded lands and optimal use 
of prime grazing lands (Dahl & Hjort, 1979). Efforts to develop Kenya’s 
dry lands and combat environmental degradation address themselves 
to the symptoms rather than the causes. A radical shift is needed in 
government policies in order to reverse environmental degradation 
and promote sound use of the dry lands. The state has to recognize 
the values of nomadic pastoralism by adopting policies that foster and 
improve this indigenous system of dry land management, instead of 
imposing alien and pre-packaged models that produce more harm 
than good.
Moreover, the state must encourage the participation of people in 
the development processes affecting them. Advocates of development 
from below emphasize these points: self-reliance among the rural pop-
ulace and the use of appropriate technology at the grassroots level 
and to define a new strategy whose objective is “no longer economic 
growth but social development, with focus on specific human needs in 
congruence with the ecological constraints. In such a context, planning 
for rural development must become decentralized, participatory and 
deeply immersed in the particulars of local settings. Here, qualitative 
judgments, as much as quantitative techniques, must be creatively and 
transactively combined (Friedman & Douglas, 1978:163–192).
Despite decades of experimentation with various development 
approaches, the problems of poverty and decline in economic well-be-
ing persist. The rural poor are becoming more marginalized and pow-
erless to change their adverse conditions. The path of “development” 
that the state has followed include the settling of pastoralists in towns 
and villages, ostensibly to provide them with the necessary govern-
ment services such as health and education, as well as instilling in 
them a sense of “nationhood.” Sedentary agricultural practices are 
‘also encouraged as a way of increasing food production, combatting 
desertification, and improving the standard of living among the inhab-
itants of these dry lands. The ultimate goal is to make them “self-suf-
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ficient,” the assumption of course being that pastoralism promotes 
dependency on the state. These policies, however, ignore the basic fact 
that rotational pastoralism has evolved as the best possible response to 
the adverse ecological conditions that prevail in the dry lands; and that 
to a large extent, the mobility of pastoralists is motivated by sound eco-
logical considerations that permit the regeneration of denuded lands 
and optimal use of prime grazing lands. Efforts to develop Kenya’s 
dry lands and combat environmental degradation address themselves 
to the symptoms rather than the causes. A radical shift is overdue in 
government policies in order to reverse environmental degradation 
and promote sound use of the dry lands. The state has to recognize 
the values of nomadic pastoralism by adopting policies that foster and 
improve this indigenous system of dry land management, instead of 
imposing alien and pre-packaged models that produce more harm 
than good.
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